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Below are some extracts from Hookway v GMP which is getting the Police and the Home Secretary and commentators in a complete tizz.
Personally I do not see what the problem is. There is nothing in this to say that the Police cannot bail and re-bail as they do now. What it does say is that if the suspect upon answering bail is to be re-interviewed outside the shorter custody limits or the maximum 96 hours if a warrant of further detention is granted then that can only be done IF there is new evidence to allow a suspect to be re-arrested.
I see no problem with this at all.
This case was about detention upon answering bail not about bail and re-bail per se.
Too often the Police arrest people lock them up and then investigate the case. That is relevant for serious offences-which is why the custody clock can be extended through a statutory framework but does it really apply to shop theft or minor public order cases or minor assault. Remember the Police can hold for up to 24 hours.
So what happens is a suspect is arrested upon a complaint before any investigation at all is undertaken. They are locked up and the Police make enquiries- take statements, find cctv footage etc etc. They do it very slowly. During that time there is an initial 6 hour review and then reviews every 8 hours. The idea is that an Inspector is supposed to decide if detention is still authorised. Mostly this is a rubber stamp job because the Police, in theory, are making enquiries. Maybe though they are not. The suspect, after 12 hours say, is interviewed and asked for his "agenda". This means the Police have no evidence at all. He is bailed and returns only to be further detained so now he can be questioned more thoroughly as the Police have (finally) made some enquiries. Memories have faded. Evidence is not fresh.
What about internet child porn cases? Currently the Police will search a person’s house, seise equipment and interview a person for his agenda based upon a report from the FBI or CIA or CEOPS or Interpol that a person has been accessing a site where child pornography is located. The suspect will be bailed and interviewed after the computer and associated equipment has been forensically examined. He may be bailed again and re-interviewed pending a decision by the Crown Prosecution Service who may request the Police for certain further questions to be put before finally considering whether or not to charge. The suspect is re-bailed. This process will take months before a decison is reached and the suspect released NFA (No Further Action) or charged.
Police bail drags on for months and months. Evidence becomes stale.
The way that PACE, the Codes of Practice Code C and the custody clock have been abused by the Police and the CPS (as a mechanism to duisguise inefficiencies) is a disgrace and an excuse for inefficient, lock-em-up-ask-questions-later Policing.
Maybe now the Police will focus on their job and gather evidence before an arrest is made.
In serious cases this will not be a problem as, currently, a lot more effort is put into these cases to investigate quickly.
In any event a suspect can be re-arrested if new evidence comes to light. If further offences come to light the custody clock starts all over again.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
ADMINSTRATIVE COURT
Neutral Citation Number: [2011] EWHC 1578 (Admin)
Case No: CO / 3649 / 2011
18. There can be no doubt that police practice in this case has been conducted on the basis that, while any authorised period of detention remains unexpired, the suspect may be released on bail and that his detention can be reauthorised so that he can be reinterviewed at any time during the theoretically "unused" period of authorised detention. Indeed in the case of serious offences where extensive investigations have to be conducted, as in this case, it is common for there to be a series of bail dates leading up to a final charging decision with or without further interview.
19. However, on reflection it seems to me that in many such cases a suspect is bailed and only re-interviewed on a re-arrest when new evidence has come to light, see for example sections 41(9), 42(11) and 43(19) of the Act. It is only in cases like the present, where there is a desire to re-interview a suspect without fresh evidence having come to light, that any problem arises. I do not consider therefore that rejection of the claimant's submissions would be as damaging to police practice as Ms Whyte was perhaps inclined to submit.
Below are some extracts from Hookway v GMP which is getting the Police and the Home Secretary and commentators in a complete tizz.
Personally I do not see what the problem is. There is nothing in this to say that the Police cannot bail and re-bail as they do now. What it does say is that if the suspect upon answering bail is to be re-interviewed outside the shorter custody limits or the maximum 96 hours if a warrant of further detention is granted then that can only be done IF there is new evidence to allow a suspect to be re-arrested.
I see no problem with this at all.
This case was about detention upon answering bail not about bail and re-bail per se.
Too often the Police arrest people lock them up and then investigate the case. That is relevant for serious offences-which is why the custody clock can be extended through a statutory framework but does it really apply to shop theft or minor public order cases or minor assault. Remember the Police can hold for up to 24 hours.
So what happens is a suspect is arrested upon a complaint before any investigation at all is undertaken. They are locked up and the Police make enquiries- take statements, find cctv footage etc etc. They do it very slowly. During that time there is an initial 6 hour review and then reviews every 8 hours. The idea is that an Inspector is supposed to decide if detention is still authorised. Mostly this is a rubber stamp job because the Police, in theory, are making enquiries. Maybe though they are not. The suspect, after 12 hours say, is interviewed and asked for his "agenda". This means the Police have no evidence at all. He is bailed and returns only to be further detained so now he can be questioned more thoroughly as the Police have (finally) made some enquiries. Memories have faded. Evidence is not fresh.
What about internet child porn cases? Currently the Police will search a person’s house, seise equipment and interview a person for his agenda based upon a report from the FBI or CIA or CEOPS or Interpol that a person has been accessing a site where child pornography is located. The suspect will be bailed and interviewed after the computer and associated equipment has been forensically examined. He may be bailed again and re-interviewed pending a decision by the Crown Prosecution Service who may request the Police for certain further questions to be put before finally considering whether or not to charge. The suspect is re-bailed. This process will take months before a decison is reached and the suspect released NFA (No Further Action) or charged.
Police bail drags on for months and months. Evidence becomes stale.
The way that PACE, the Codes of Practice Code C and the custody clock have been abused by the Police and the CPS (as a mechanism to duisguise inefficiencies) is a disgrace and an excuse for inefficient, lock-em-up-ask-questions-later Policing.
Maybe now the Police will focus on their job and gather evidence before an arrest is made.
In serious cases this will not be a problem as, currently, a lot more effort is put into these cases to investigate quickly.
In any event a suspect can be re-arrested if new evidence comes to light. If further offences come to light the custody clock starts all over again.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
ADMINSTRATIVE COURT
Neutral Citation Number: [2011] EWHC 1578 (Admin)
Case No: CO / 3649 / 2011
B e f o r e :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE McCOMBE
____________________
____________________
Between:
| THE QUEEN (ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE) | Claimant | |
| - and - | ||
| SALFORD MAGISTRATES' COURT and PAUL HOOKWAY | Defendant Interested Party |
18. There can be no doubt that police practice in this case has been conducted on the basis that, while any authorised period of detention remains unexpired, the suspect may be released on bail and that his detention can be reauthorised so that he can be reinterviewed at any time during the theoretically "unused" period of authorised detention. Indeed in the case of serious offences where extensive investigations have to be conducted, as in this case, it is common for there to be a series of bail dates leading up to a final charging decision with or without further interview.
19. However, on reflection it seems to me that in many such cases a suspect is bailed and only re-interviewed on a re-arrest when new evidence has come to light, see for example sections 41(9), 42(11) and 43(19) of the Act. It is only in cases like the present, where there is a desire to re-interview a suspect without fresh evidence having come to light, that any problem arises. I do not consider therefore that rejection of the claimant's submissions would be as damaging to police practice as Ms Whyte was perhaps inclined to submit.
22. ………In my judgment moreover the question in this case is not whether a release on bail before the expiry of the warrant extinguishes an unexpired period of authorised detention. The questions are the logically anterior ones, namely, what was the period of extension granted on 7 November 2010; has it expired, and, whether expired or not, can it be extended under section 44. Section 43 has already been quoted. It provides that a warrant for further detention can be granted before the expiry of 36 hours after the relevant time, I repeat, 12.40 on 7 November 2010. If further detention is justified within the meaning of section 43(4) of the Act, the court can grant a warrant of further detention. It is provided by section 43(10) that the warrant is to state the time of issue and authorise the detention for the period stated in it. The period is not to be longer than 36 hours. In this case the authorisation was for 36 hours "from the time of issue of the warrant", ie 36 hours from 18:22 on 8 November 2010. On any ordinary reading of that language as Ms Whyte's skeleton argument expressly acknowledges (in the grid set out in paragraph 6) this time expired on 10 November at 06:22 hours. That is what the warrant provided for and, therefore, subject to any further statutory saving, the period expired on 10 November 2010. It was not running on the occasions when Mr Hookway attended at the police station thereafter. As a matter of simple language none of those dates was within 36 hours "from the time of the issue of this warrant".
23. The next question however is whether section 44 would permit an extension of time notwithstanding the expiry of the time granted under warrant itself. I have already quoted section 44, which does not identify any time limit for the making of an application for an extension of a WFD; however it does provide that a warrant may be extended for such period as the court thinks fit but with limits. The limits are those set out in Section 44(3). As already stated, that provides:
"(3) The period shall not—
(a) be longer than 36 hours; or
(b) end later than 96 hours after the relevant time."
24. Accordingly again in accordance with ordinary language, the court could not grant any extension for a period which ended later than 96 hours after 12.40 on 7 November 2010, ie 12.40 on 10 November. Again subject to further statutory provisions I do not see how the Magistrates' Court on 5 April could have granted an extension to a date later than 96 hours after 12.40 on 7 November. That time had long since passed; the court was powerless. Subsection 44(3) provided a statutory buffer to any period of extension and that buffer had long since been reached. It was no longer possible for the court to extend the warrant for a period ending before that time. It seems to me therefore that that is an end of the matter.
25. It remains for me to consider whether, as suggested, section 47(6) provides a solution. I have referred to that section briefly already. It is in the following terms:
"Where a person who has been granted bail and either has attended at the police station in accordance with the grant of bail or has been arrested under section 46A above is detained at a police station, any time during which he was in police detention prior to being granted bail shall be included as part of any period which falls to be calculated under this Part of this Act."
26. I am afraid that I am unable to see how that subsection can operate to push back the date laid down expressly as the end date for any period of extension or warrant of further detention that has been set out in Section 44(3). It simply provides that if a suspect has been released on bail the time in detention must be counted in any period which "falls to be calculated under this part of this Act". If a period has expired it no longer falls to be calculated at all. If the suspect has been released on bail before the expiry of the statutory period which has not expired and is bailed to return within that period his earlier detention must be counted. However, that does not affect the limit of the court's powers expressly stated in section 44(3). If time in fact remains it can be used up. However, section 47(6) cannot alter the express limits on the court's powers set out in Section 44(3). I do not see that Professor Zander QC is saying any more than this in the fifth edition of his celebrated work on the Act, in paragraphs 4.85 and 4.86 at page 180 of the book. He is saying nothing about the limit or extent of the court's powers to grant extensions to warrants as laid down in section 44.
27. It seems to me however, for reasons identified, the consequences are not as severe as might be feared in impeding police investigations in the vast majority of cases. This is simply because in the usual case a suspect returning on bail will either be released because the evidence is not sufficient to warrant a charge or he will be re-arrested under statutory powers because new evidence has come to light. However, for the reasons that I have endeavoured to explain, the present application must be dismissed.
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